VIA: ATR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)		D. ATCH NO. SGAA-1.3519
	CLASSIFICATION	
TO : Chief, SE		DATE: 10 January 1955
Attn:		
SUBJECT: GENERAL— OBHUNT/FRIDA	AY	
	on Progress Report - 27 December 1954	
REF: SGAA 13206, KAPOK 3092,	17 December 1954	
Action Requested: None. For	· Headquarters' informat	ion and files.
Synopsis:		
1. RNDOLLAR and AIRBRET) were brought to Athens	for staging on 15 December.
2. AIRBRED refused the	mission on grounds of i	ll health.
3. ATRBLOWN was substit	tuted for ATRERED at the	eleventh hour.
4. Team infiltrated the morning of 22 Decemb	•	and exfiltrated in the early
5. The penetration was dead drop.	a failure as nothing wa	s found at the site of the
6. ATRBRED was separate reasons.	ed from KUBARK and remov	ed to an island for security
7. RNDOLLAR is to be po	olygraphed soon.	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Account of Developments:	·	SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
1. December 14:		DATE 2007
and outlined plans for to one despite existing unpowas informed that AIPRATE the border. GADRIVET ex	the mounting of FRIDAY. Dleasantness that day over would be assigned the pressed concern over does the presence of shepher which the FRIDAY par	and met with GADRIVEN The meeting was a harmonious er the Cyprus question. e task of conducting the team to gs in the target area but be- rds and dogs in the "strip" ty travels.
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b made arrangements with for the movement of RNDOLLAR and AIRBRED to Athens from Kalamai.
2. December 15:
a. RNDOLLAR and AIRBRED arrived in Athens and were taken to Annapolis house where AIDRUGGET had been installed to care for them.
b. C J, C J and C J carried the clothing and equipment to Annapolis and had a preliminary discussion with the team regarding the mission
c. ATRERED announced at the first opportunity that he was suffering from appendicitis and could not possibly go on a mission in his condition. He produced the written diagnosis of a Kalamai doctor to the effect he had mild armendicitis. He added that the doctor had advised him to have his ammendix removed immediately. When it became evident that ATRERED was really serious about his condition and his decision to remain behind, \(\sigma\) was called in to examine the man. After \(\sigma\) had finished looking ATRERED over he asked that a blood count be taken so that he could make a more thorough diagnosis.
3. December 1.6:
a. Z took ATRBRED to Athens for a blood count.
b. C went to Annapolis with the intention of presenting a short refresher to the team on weapons and night marching. He found AJRBRED still convinced that he was seriously ill, although his pains had all disappeared.
c. AIRBRED was asked by
4. December 17:
a. Treported that no symptoms of appendicities were discernable in his examination or in the results of the blood count. ATREATE was informed of this but insisted he had the affliction regardless of the doctor's findings.

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	b. '		Jιń	d [Joriefed the	team	on	the	ນse	of	anti-doc	devices
and	the	charact	erist	ics of	trained dogs.							

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5. December 18:

- a. ATRBRED was approached for the last time on the subject of accepting the mission. He admitted to the fact that his pains were all gone but continued to profess that he was physically incapable of accomplishing an operational task. Having used all possible persuasion on the man in vain, we acceeded to his decision and immediately removed him to the "Dig" safehouse apartment in Athens.
- b. Upon the departure of ATRBRED, the subject of a singleton mission was again broached to RMDCHAR. In an interview that lasted over an hour we were unable to shake RMDCHAR from his determination to have someone accompany him. We decided to suspend our efforts when RMDCHAR showed signs of becoming extremely perturbed. As an alternative to a singleton mission, RMDCHAR agreed to accept our decision on the selection of a man to accompany him.
- c. In anticipation of this development we had previously arranged for AIRBLOWN to stand by in Athens. He was called in and offered the assignment in general terms. AINBLOWN immediately and unquestioningly accepted the proposition and was taken to Annapolis in the early afternoon to join RNDOWIAR. He was equipped the same day.
- 6. December 19: \subset _____, \subset _____and \subset _____ picked up ENDOWLAR and ATRBLOWN in a 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton stake truck and began the drive north to the Emin Aga rendezvous point. The night was spent at a camp site south of Arta.
- 7. December 20: The team received its final briefing during the truck trip from the campsite to the Emin Aga rendezvous. Rendezvous was made at 1025 hours and the team delivered to ATPRATE who had been accompanied by C J. (C J s report on his preparations in Ioannina for the FRIDAY penetration will be forwarded in a JAN report.) C J and C J returned to Athens with the truck upon completion of the transfer. (Events from the time of the transfer this date to the return of FRIDAY to the "Dig" for debriefing on 22 December are covered in the attached memo and the debriefing which is forwarded separately.)
- 8. December 22: AIRBRED was transferred to Annapolis house prior to the arrival of FRIDAY to the "Dig."

 discussed plans for moving him to the Island of Paros with

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a.			\supset	and		_	e	ach	del	oriefe	ed b	oth	team	memb	ers	separa	ately
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debrief	fing	with	ı p	erti	ner	ıt	comm	ent	is	forwa	erde	d se	eparat	ely.	,		

b. ATRBRED was given a full security debriefing by and ATRBRED was given a full security debriefing by and ATRBREM. He was paid off and made to sign the documents separating him from KUBARK. He seemed embarrassed by his refusal to infiltrate and worried about what the future held in store. He was resigned to his fate, however, and if he had any rancor for his employers he managed to conceal it well. We hope that his ultimate disposal through USEP channels will be possible within a reasonable length of time.

10. December 24:

- a. ATRBLOWN was released from the "Dig" and returned to his two collegues ATPUMP and ATRWAY. He had told them when he left on the 18th of December that he was going to be used as an interpreter by the office for a week or so. His story was carefully discussed with him again before he left the "Dig."
- b. ATRERED was delivered to the appropriate Greek authorities and was then conducted to Paros.

 Z gave him a final check-up prior to his departure and pronounced him fit to travel.
- 11. December 27: RNDOLLAR was returned to Kalamai to await preparations for his LCFLUTTER.

12. Comments:

- a. This account will be supplimented by a progress report covering the period 28 December through 14 January in order to preserve the continuity of our reporting system.
- b. We are holding final analysis of this operation until we have the results of RNDOWAR's impending LOFFUTTER.

7 W	Attachment: Memo PMW/RSO/JLK/nkr January 1955		- (
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3 - Wash w/att in trip

1 - Chrono W/att

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TROM:	: _	コ						
SUBJ			n Operation o of Team to t		cember 1954	•		·
1.	At 1039	hours of rived in	? 20 December the operatio	, Friday Tonal vehicl	'eam, escorte e A-839 at	ed by E the RV poin	t of Emin	Jand Aga.
vehic	cle esc	orted by (arty was dul	and C	J.			
	and beti	ween the p	ng meeting Cooints of Ska scure approac	la and Kat	c Aetos was	occupied b	y Greek sh	
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As a result of this meeting, it was arranged that the team would be conducted to point Avioi Theodoroi via the coast.

2. The Team and _____ were subsequently transferred to the covered KYF vchicle which left immediately for Ioannina. On arrival at the town, _____ was discharged in a secure spot and the vehicle continued its way to Filiates.

The party arrived there at dusk of the same day. The Captain reported to the Battalion G2 to collect any last minute intelligence and a guide. During this time \square and the Team remained in the covered truck.

The truck resumed its course towards Skala but stopped at the road juncture of Smerto since the road from there on is observed by the Albanian post of Likojanit.

After a march of approximately two hours the party arrived at Skala where the officer in command of the post was waiting.

3. The conducting party, now consisting of the Team, AIPRATE, the Skala Post Lieutenant, _____ and a KYF soldier, resumed its march to the border along the coastline at 2300 hours of 20 December.

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After a somewhat delayed march of three hours, necessitated by the Team's exhaustion and various attempts to circumvent shepherds and their attacking dogs, the conducting party arrived at Point R413532 where the remaining might was spent.

4. At dawn the team escorted by the Lieutenant surveyed the plain of Monispol from point Rh17536. On completion of the survey the party remained hiding throughout the day.

Notwithstanding certain precautions, the hideout was discovered by the shepherds who surrounded and challenged the party. After due intervention they returned to their pastoral duties.

5. Around noon, RMDCLIAR expressed once again his concern about the Albanian border post of Skembi (R403553) and implied that he would hesitate to infiltrate unless he got definite information on Albanian activities at this point.

The Greek Lieutenant therefore proceeded to a point in the vicinity of Pyramid 72 from where he was able to ascertain that the post was deserted and the building neglected.

- 6. At 1735, 21 December, Friday Team was conducted through the shepherd's compound. (The Lieutenant had previously ordered the shepherds to keep their dogs tied up.) At point R407541 at 1740 hours the Team separated from the conducting detail.
- 7. The team returned at 0200 hours of 22 December (see debriefings). After a three hour rest the party returned along the same route to Skala and was driven from there to the airfield of Ioannina.

The team and __ __ escorted by __ __ : were flown to Athens and subsequently moved to the "Dig" for debriefing.

8. Conclusions:

- a. Overland infiltrations between points Arkoudi and Kato Aetos are not recommended while Greek shepherds occupy the area (winter pastures).
- b. — — would have discontinued the operation if the mission were not of one night's duration because of the activity in the area.
- c. Operations of this sort and at this time of the year can be secure if conducted with maritime support (specifically, the ravine at R393540 is particularly suitable).
- d. The Team's marching abilities were poor.
- e. KYP cooperation was very good

9. Porder Intelligence:

- a. The Albanian post of Skembi is deserted.
- b. There is a long and broad plowed strip at points 2395552 to 2397552.



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